Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, And The Nature Of Value (Cambridge Studies In Philosophy)
Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)
How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm rejects the standard philosophical answers to these questions, which presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and impulse, and develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons.
"This book is a significant contribution to some of the most central debates in moral psychology and represents an important advance in the articulation of a broadly McDowellian approach to them." Ethics
About the Author
Bennett Helm is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Franklin and Marshall College.